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1. Copyright Enforcement by Technical Protection Measures
Digital products such as movies, music and computer software are protected both
by self-help measures such as encryption and copy controls, and by the legal right
to prevent copying. The purpose of this paper is to understand how digital rights
management and other technical protections a®ect the pricing of content, and con-
sequently, why content users, content vendors, and antitrust authorities might have
di®erent views on what technical capabilities should be deployed.
We begin by giving examples of the varied systems that have been tried or are
currently in use. Protection for digital content has been evolving since the 1980's,
with the legally mandated Serial Copy Management System for digital audio tape.
This system caused the quality of copies to degrade, so that, as with analog audio
tapes, it was hard to make faithful copies of copies. The solution was inelegant at
best, but in any case, has become obsolete due to the proliferation of other digital
mediums. In the late 1980's, vendors began to sell software for personal computers
with a one-installation feature. These measures were cumbersome, restricted fair use,
and were rapidly circumvented.
As content distribution has moved to the internet, watermark and encryption
technologies have developed. A watermark, by analogy with a watermark on paper
stationery, is a piece of software code embedded in a program. If illicit copies of the
software circulate, the watermark can identify the original buyer or licensee of the
copy that is circulating. This may or may not be useful, depending on whether the
original buyer or licensee can be held liable. Encryption systems attempt to make
digital content uninterpretable or inaccessible without use of a code key. The code key
generally authorizes playing the content on a speci¯c piece of hardware. For example,
the movie industry has developed digital versatile disks (DVDs), which are protected
by a technology called the Content Scrambling System (CSS). CSS authorizes access
by matching a code embedded in disks to a code embedded in DVD players. Among
other purposes, this system ensures that movies released for viewing in one region of
the world cannot be viewed in another that may have a later release date.
Although it may be possible for each content provider to implement its own
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protection system, there are many proposals for coordinated industry-wide standards.
However, standardization of technical protections does not imply standardization of
media players or vice versa. A technical protection system can be implemented on
di®erent media players, and a media player can implement di®erent technical protec-
tion systems. For example, since the personal computer is currently the primary
device used to play and organize digital media, calls for protection are in°uencing its
design. Intel introduced a controversial serial number on its Pentium III chip that
could potentially identify speci¯c computers for watermarking or encryption purposes.
The Microsoft-led Trusted Computing platform promises to provide a \hack-proof"
environment that can restrict the viewing or playing of content to authorized comput-
ers. MPEG4, the updated standard for digital video encoding, provides \hooks" for
a technical protection system, and does not specify a particular implementation.
Technical protection platforms raise a host of issues regarding ownership, licens-
ing, and price control over players as well as content. For DVDs, both the hardware
and software are proprietary, and jointly licensed. On the hardware side, Toshiba
administers the licenses, charging per-unit license fees on the sale of DVD media,
players, and decoders. The collected fees are then distributed to the patentholders
(Hitachi, Matsushita Electric, Time Warner, Toshiba, and Victor) proportionally to
each member's holdings in the patent portfolio. On the software side, the Motion
Pictures Expert Group (MPEG), which includes device manufacturers, content com-
panies, and others, use similar terms to license the digital video and audio algorithms
(called \codecs") used on DVDs and digital television. Finally, the DVD Copy Con-
trol Association (DVD-CCA), controlled primarily by the content industry, licenses
the technical protection measure known as the Content Scramble System (CSS). These
license fees are linked to players rather than to usage of digital content.
The license on DVD hardware is for a \pool" of patents. Patent pooling
for standardization is generally thought to be pro-competitive, barring practices that
are anticompetitive or not necessary for the dissemination of intellectual property
(Shapiro 2001). The Department of Justice Antitrust Division issued favorable review
letters on both the DVD and the MPEG licensing agreements. Notably, however, the
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review of these agreements focused almost entirely on the competitive e®ects in device
markets. As the licensing fees were only at the encoding/decoding level in the physical
media, the e®ect on the content market was assumed to be minimal, and only brie°y
considered. This, however, is the focus of our paper.
Much of the emphasis below will be on the cost of circumvention, and how
it a®ects the pricing of digital content. From that perspective, the issue is not
whether content providers implement di®erent protections, but whether a circumven-
tion reduces the cost of the next circumvention. If the means of circumvention are
substantially similar, in the sense that circumventing one system is tantamount to
circumventing all of them, then for our purposes, the content providers are using the
same system. We will ¯rst stylize the problem as if content providers use di®erent
systems, in the sense that there are no such cost advantages, and then as if they use
the same system, in the sense that a single circumvention gives access to all content.
A shared system makes circumvention more attractive. This is key to our analysis.
In section 2 we assume that each content provider has its own technical pro-
tection system, and show that technical protections lead to lower prices for content
than perfect legal enforcement, at least when each vendor provides his own protection
system. Surprisingly, lower prices might lead to the result that technical protection
is better for providers as well as users, as compared to perfect enforcement of legal
protection. This is essentially because, even if per-period pro¯t is smaller, there is no
legal end to protection by technical means.
Even more surprisingly, we show in sections 3, 4 and 5 that jointly owned
and implemented industry standards { which obviously have a potential for collusion
{ can lead to lower prices for content than independently deployed systems. This
depends both on the degree of substitutability in vendors' digital products and on the
cost structure for technical protection. In sections 6 and 7, we investigate how the
competitive environment is a®ected by technical capabilities, from the point of view
of both consumers and vendors.
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2. Technical Protections and Proprietary Pricing
Probably the most severe criticism of intellectual property as an incentive mechanism
is that, in allowing content creators to raise prices to the monopoly level, it creates
deadweight loss by excluding users. Will technical protections exacerbate this problem
or serve as an antidote? One reason the answer is not obvious is that the strength of
protection is an optimizing choice. Even if it is possible to exclude all unauthorized
users, the vendor will not typically ¯nd it pro¯table to do so. It may be cheaper to
price so that circumvention is deterred rather than to bear the high costs of imple-
menting a hackproof protection system. The incentive to avoid circumvention and to
avoid the high cost of protection will have a moderating in°uence on price.
The assumption here, following Conner and Rumelt (1991), is that a user will
buy a legitimate copy instead of circumventing the protection system whenever the
price of the legitimate copy is lower than the cost of circumvention. The vendor's
optimizing strategy takes account of this. We also assume that, although individual
circumventors can circumvent without detection, they cannot make the content freely
available on the internet, or sell a circumvention tool. Those activities would be easily
detectable and would put the circumventor in jeopardy under the Digital Millenium
Copyright Act. The issues surrounding unprotected existing content currently
In this section we show that technical protection will generally result in a
lower market price than the monopoly price that would be charged with perfect legal
enforcement. In the Appendix, we show that dispersion in the costs of circumvention
may exert yet another downward in°uence on price.
To be more concrete, index agents by µ 2 [0; 1], uniformly distributed, and
suppose that the willingness to pay of agent µ is µ: Figure 1 shows a willingness to
pay (WTP) curve, also called the inverse demand curve, for copies of a work. For
each price p; the number of potential users with willingness to pay µ greater than p is
1¡ p: At price p; the consumers' surplus of buyers is
s(p) =
Z 1
p
(µ ¡ p) dµ = 1
2
(1¡ p)2 (2.1)
We assume that the marginal cost of copying is zero. Thus, if copying can be con-
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trolled, the monopoly price will be p¤ = 1=2; which maximizes per-period pro¯t,
¼(p) = p(1¡ p):
However, if the copies cannot be controlled, the demand curve for legitimate copies
falls to zero. Technical protection measures can mitigate this problem.
Index the strength of protection by e 2 R+, and interpret e as the cost of
circumvention. Formalizing the intuition that the cost of protection increases su-
perlinearly in the cost of circumvention, denote the cost of implementing protection
level e by K(e) > 0; where K and K 0 are increasing. We shall ¯rst suppose that
the cost of circumvention is the same for all users, which we will also take to be e:
After the rightholder has chosen the strength of protection, e, he must set a price. If
e > p¤, then the optimal price is p¤: It is therefore wasteful to implement a protection
e > p¤, since the proprietor does not need such strong protection in order to charge the
monopoly price. If e < p¤; the optimal price is p = e; the cost of circumvention: At
that price, no users will circumvent the technical protection measure in equilibrium.
Thus, for any e · p¤; the ¯rm's pro¯t as a function of e is ¼(e)¡K(e), where
both ¼ and K are increasing, and ¼ °attens out for e > p¤: The pro¯t-maximizing
level of protection, say e^; maximizes the di®erence between pro¯t and cost, and must
be lower than p¤. Thus,
Remark 1. If each user's cost of circumvention is e when the protection level is
e; the pro¯t-maximizing level of protection e^ satis¯es e^ < p¤; where p¤ is the pro¯t-
maximizing price with perfect legal enforcement. The pro¯t-maximizing price satis¯es
p^ = e^ < p¤. There is no circumvention in equilibrium.
Now suppose that there is dispersion to the costs of circumvention. For this
case we must de¯ne an \e®ective" demand curve that recognizes that some agents
may circumvent rather than buy legitimate copies. To de¯ne the e®ective demand
curve, assume that each user will buy if both his willingness to pay and his personal
cost of circumvention, say c; are higher than the price. Agent µ will buy if µ; c ¸ p:
He will circumvent if both his willingness to pay and the price are higher than his cost
of circumvention, µ; p ¸ c. Suppose that the costs of circumvention are distributed
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according to a distribution function G with density g; independently of µ; such that,
if e > e0; then G(¢; e) stochastically dominates G(¢; e0):1 At the price and protection
(p; e); the demand for legitimate copies is
(1¡ p)(1¡G(p; e))
The term (1¡ p) represents the fraction of consumers for whom willingness to pay is
higher than the price, and the term (1¡G(p; e)) represents the fraction for whom the
circumvention cost is higher than the price.
The proprietor's pro¯t is
¦(p; e) = p(1¡ p)(1¡G(p; e))¡K(e) (2.2)
For each e; let p(e) be the price that maximizes ¦(p; e). Given this setup, we
prove the following result in the appendix:
Remark 2: When the costs of circumvention are dispersed, for every e; p(e) < p¤:
Suppose that the costs of circumvention are uniformly distributed with expected value
e when the protection level is e: If e^; ~e are respectively the pro¯t-maximizing protection
levels when circumvention costs are not dispersed and when dispersed uniformly, then
p(~e) < e^ < p¤:
Thus the threat of circumvention lowers the price of content, and dispersion in
circumvention costs may lower it even more.
While the price and pro¯t are lower in each period, the technical protection
can continue forever, and may thus end up being more pro¯table than perfect legal
enforcement, which eventually expires. This may even be true if the costs K are
taken into account. Moreover, it is not obvious that the threat of circumvention
increases consumer welfare, even though it reduces the per-period price. This is
again because the technical protection can continue inde¯nitely, rather than expiring,
as an intellectual property right does. In fact, a technical protection system can
increase both consumer welfare and the proprietor's pro¯t, as compared with perfect
legal enforcement for a limited duration.
1That is, G(c; e0) > G(c; e) for every c in the support of G:
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We will show this in an example, but ¯rst we make a preliminary comment on
the optimal structure of rewards to creation. For each p; let DWL(p) be the lost
consumers' surplus at the price p (deadweight loss). Remark 3 says that if a lower
price is coupled with longer protection to just the extent that total pro¯t is preserved,
and if this has the e®ect of reducing the deadweight-loss-to-pro¯t ratio, consumers are
better o®. This ratio test is satis¯ed for linear demand curves, as assumed here.
By assuming that revenue is held ¯xed, Remark 3 focuses on the optimal struc-
ture of rewards ex post. It allows us to consider ex post e±ciency without considering
the ex ante incentive to create. In the remainder of this paper, where we consider gov-
ernance structures for sharing technical protections, the ex ante and ex post e±ciency
issues are not so easy to disentangle.
Remark 3:2 Suppose a legal regime lasts T ¤ discounted years3 with monopoly price
p¤; and suppose a technical protection regime lasts T (e) discounted years, T (e) > T ¤
with price p(e) that satis¯es p(e) < p¤: Suppose that the revenue earned in both
regimes is the same, ¼(p(e))T (e) = ¼(p¤)T ¤. Then consumers are better o® if and
only if
DWL(p¤)
¼(p¤)
>
DWL(p(e))
¼(p(e))
(2.3)
Proof: Since p(e) < p¤; the per-period consumers' surplus is higher, s (p(e)) >
s (p¤). With perfectly enforceable copyrights, total consumers surplus is
s (p¤)T ¤ + (
1
r
¡ T ¤)s(0);
2The ratio test for whether a simultaneous price reduction and lengthening of protection helps
consumers was introduced in the antitrust context by Kaplow 1984 to evaluate the desirability of
licensing practices, and in the patent design context by Tandon (1982) and many subsequent authors
(see Scotchmer (2005), chapter 4) to evaluate the desirability of making patents broad or narrow.
The notable feature of the ratio test is that the comparison is reduced to a static one. Even though
deadweight loss lasts longer in the technical protection regime, we only have to observe that the ratio
of deadweight loss to pro¯t is reduced in each period in order to know whether in total the technical
protection regime is better for consumers.
3The length of protection T is taken to be already discounted. If the statutory length of protection
is ¿; and the discount rate is r; then T =
R ¿
0
e¡rtdt: The discounted length of protection, T; cannot
be larger than 1=r; which corresponds to ¿ =1:
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where s(0) = 1
2
is the per-period consumers' surplus after the protection ends, when
the product will be \sold" at the competitive price, zero. Analogously, we shall write
s (p(e))T (e) + (
1
r
¡ T (e))s(0)
for consumers' surplus with the technical protection in place. Consumers are better
o® with technical protection of length T (e) if and only if:
(s (0)¡ s (p¤)) T ¤ ¡ (s (0)¡ s (p(e)))T (e) > 0 (2.4)
Remark 3 follows from the observation that the consumers' surplus that is lost
due to higher than competitive prices is equal to pro¯t plus deadweight loss. Therefore,
s (0)¡ s (p¤) = ¼(p¤) +DWL(p¤)
s (0)¡ s (p(e)) = ¼(p(e)) +DWL(p(e))
Then, using T ¤¼(p¤) = T (e)¼(p(e)); the inequality (2.4) holds if and only if (2.3)
holds. ¤
However, this conceptual experiment is not quite the right one for comparing
costless enforcement of copyrights with technical protections. Technical protections
can continue forever { protection will not end at the duration T (e) required for the
pro¯t equivalence: Further, technical protections are costly. Nevertheless, this line
of reasoning correctly suggests that technical protections can sometimes make both
creators and consumers better o®. We show this with an example.
Example: As argued above, if there is no dispersion of circumvention costs,
the optimal price with a technical protection is p(e) = e. Thus, consumers' surplus
per period of time with technical protection is s(p(e)) = 1
2
(1¡ e)2:
Social surplus is greater with technical protection than with perfect legal en-
forcement if
T ¤s(p¤) +
µ
1
r
¡ T ¤
¶
s(0) · 1
r
s(p(e)) (2.5)
Pro¯t is greater with technical protection than with perfect legal enforcement
if
T ¤ (p¤ (1¡ p¤)) · 1
r
(e(1¡ e)¡K(e)) (2.6)
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Let the cost function K be given by
K(e) =
1
80
if e · 1=4
e2 ¡ 1
20
if e > 1=4
The level of protection that maximizes e(1¡e)¡K(e) is e = 1=4: The conditions
(2.6) and (2.5) on pro¯t and social surplus are satis¯ed if the discount rate and length
of legal protection satisfy
7
12
< rT ¤ <
7
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3. Independent Technical Protections and Competition
We now turn from monopoly to competition, and consider how the pricing of digital
content depends on the protection system. Prices will depend on whether the content
providers implement separate systems or share a common one. Our objective is to
develop several benchmarks, as a prelude to discussing collusion. However, as will
become clear, one of the di±culties is in knowing how to de¯ne collusion.
The table below lays out the cases for comparison, partly as a guide to notation.
Vendors may implement separate systems for their content or a shared one, and they
can price independently or collude. When vendors share a protection system, they
must somehow cover their shared protection costs. Much of what follows is directed
at the question of how to apportion the costs without giving the ¯rms an opportunity
to coordinate pricing, especially since the level of protection must depend on prices.
Protections:
Pricing:
None
Legal Enforcement
Independent
System
Shared
System
Independent I^ I
Joint C J
A ¯nding below is that prices may be higher with separate systems and inde-
pendent pricing than with a shared system and collusive pricing. This is due to the
moderating e®ect that a threat of circumvention has on price. A shared system is
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more tempting to hackers, since a single hack gives access to more content. To deter
circumvention, the shared protection must be stronger, hence more costly. Instead of
bearing the high cost of joint protection, it may be cheaper for the content providers
who use the shared system to deter circumvention by lowering prices instead.
Even though protection must be stronger for a shared system than for separate
systems, the total cost of shared protection may be lower, since setup costs are only
paid once instead of twice. Balanced against the saving in ¯xed costs is the fact that
marginal costs of deploying more protection will be higher in a shared system. Thus,
a welfare comparison between the two benchmarks depends both on the cost structure
for providing technical protections and on the substitutability of content, which a®ects
the degree to which content prices are a®ected by collusion.
Suppose that the digital content of each provider is an imperfect substitute
for the other. The ¯rms face demands D1(p1; p2); D2(p1; p2), each decreasing in its
own price and increasing in the other price (the products are substitutes). The cost
of protection will again be given by a positive function K , which has ¯xed costs and
increasing marginal costs as the strength of protection increases. For simplicity we
revert to the assumption that there is no dispersion in circumvention costs, and assume
that the cost of circumvention is the level of protection, e: (In the more speci¯c model
in section 5 we will assume that K is de¯ned by K(e) = k + ·e2:)
We will ¯nd it useful to de¯ne revenue functions
R1(p1; p2) = p1D1(p1; p2)
R2(p1; p2) = p2D2(p1; p2)
To isolate the strategic issues, we will assume that the two vendors of digital
content are exactly alike, and will focus on symmetric equilibria. We make the
following assumptions. Assumption R1 ensures, among other things, that the goods
are substitutes. Assumption R2 ensures that the Nash equilibria below are unique.
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Assumption R1 [The ¯rms' prices are strategic complements.]
@2
@p1@p2
R1(p1; p2) > 0;
@2
@p1@p2
R2(p1; p2) > 0
@2
@p1@p2
[R1(p1; p2) +R2(p1; p2)¡K(p1 + p2)] > 0
Assumption R2 R1 and R2 are strictly concave and K is strictly convex.
We ¯rst consider the case of competition with perfect legal enforcement, as
that will become a benchmark for considering collusion in section 6. We also consider
competition with separate technical protections.
The prices (pI^ ; pI^) are an equilibrium with perfect legal enforcement if
R1(p
I^ ; pI^) ¸ R1(p; pI^) for all p ¸ 0
R2(p
I^ ; pI^) ¸ R2(pI^ ; p) for all p ¸ 0:
The prices (pI ; pI) are an equilibrium with separate technical protections if
R1(p
I ; pI)¡K(pI) ¸ R1(p; pI)¡K(p) for all p ¸ 0
R2(p
I ; pI)¡K(pI) ¸ R2(pI ; p)¡K(p) for all p ¸ 0:
Since we have assumed that the prices are strategic complements, it follows that
each of these equilibria exists (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, Theorem 5, or Milgrom
and Shannon, 1994, Theorem 12). Further, they are unique.4
Now suppose that the ¯rms collude, even though they implement separate
protections and have no \legitimate" right to collude. Joint pro¯ts are given by
R1(p1; p2) +R2(p1; p2)¡K(p1)¡K(p2) (3.1)
4BecauseR1 is strictly concave, (
@R1
@p1@p1
(p1; p2))
2 > ( @R1@p1@p2 (p1; p2))
2 at each (p1; p2), which implies
that @R1@p1@p1 (p1; p2) +
@R1
@p1@p2
(p1; p2) < 0: Suppose, for example, that there are two equilibria with
perfect legal enforcement, (p^; p^) and (~p; ~p). Then @R1
@p1
(~p; ~p) = @R1
@p1
(p^; p^) = 0; so @R1
@p1
(~p; ~p)¡ @R1
@p1
(p^; p^)
=0=
R ~p
p^
h
@R21
@p1@p1
(t; t) +
@R21
@p1@p2
(t; t)
i
dt; but this is a contradiction, due to assumption R2.
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The prices (pC ; pC) are collusive prices with separate protections if they maxi-
mize (3.1).
Proposition 1: Suppose that R1 and R2 hold. Then pI^ > pI and pC > pI .
Proof: We use Corollary to Theorem 6 of Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 and
Theorem 13 of Milgrom and Shannon, 1994. For pI^ > pI , write R1(p1; p2)+tK(p1) for
¯rm 1's pro¯t function (symmetrically, ¯rm 2's pro¯t function), and let t 2 [¡1; 0]:
Then t = ¡1 is the pro¯t function for equilibrium with separate technical protections,
and t = 0 is the pro¯t function for equilibrium with perfect legal enforcement. The
class of games de¯ned by t 2 [¡1; 0] are supermodular and the pro¯t functions satisfy
the single crossing property. Therefore the (unique) equilibrium prices of the games
de¯ned by t are increasing in t: This proves the result.
For pC > pI , consider a game in which ¯rm 1 and ¯rm 2 respectively have the
following payo® functions
¼1(p1; p2; t) = R1(p1; p2)¡K(p1) + t(R2(p1; p2)¡K(p2))
¼2(p1; p2; t) = R2(p1; p2)¡K(p2) + t (R1(p1; p2)¡K(p1))
and t 2 [0; 1]: If t = 0, the equilibrium is an equilibrium with separate protection
systems and if t = 1; the equilibrium is the optimum of (3.1). The class of games
de¯ned by t are supermodular and the maximands have increasing di®erences in own
price and t; for a ¯xed value of the other price. ¤
4. Shared Protections
The previous section considered pricing by two ¯rms implementing their own individ-
ual technical protections. However, the ¯rms may do better by deploying a single
system. Although a single system may create bene¯ts for users that are not modeled
here, and cut costs, it will also create a better target for hackers. Therefore the level
of protection e must be higher than with separate systems. The higher e creates an
enhanced burden because of increasing marginal cost, but that may be o®set by the
elimination of duplicated ¯xed costs.
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Continuing with the same model, if the vendors sell at prices (p1; p2); they will
need protection level e = p1 + p2 to deter a coordinated circumvention. The prices
(pJ ; pJ) are collusive prices with joint protections if they maximize joint pro¯t:
R1(p1; p2) +R2(p1; p2)¡K(p1 + p2) (4.1)
Proposition 2: Suppose that R1 and R2 hold. Then pC > pJ .
Proof: Consider the following family of maximands, parameterized by t 2 [0; 1]
R1(p1; p2) +R2(p1; p2)¡ [K(p1 + p2) + t (K(p1) +K(p2)¡K(p1 + p2))]
By assumption R1, the maximand is supermodular in (p1; p2) for each t. Since the
maximand also has increasing di®erences in (p1; p2; t) (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994,
Theorem 6), the maximum is monotonic in t (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994, Theorem
5). The optimum of (3.1) is the maximum where t = 1, and the optimum of (4.1) is
the maximum when t = 0: The result follows. ¤
We make the following remark as a prelude to our discussion of competition
policy. By competition we mean independent pricing, using separate protection sys-
tems. By collusion we mean coordinating prices, using a shared protection system.
When we say that the content providers will prefer one system to the other, we mean
that the revenue minus costs are greater. When we say that one system is socially
more e±cient than the other, this is from an ex post point of view, namely, that the
deadweight loss plus the cost of the protection system is smaller. As previously noted
in section 2, however, reducing pro¯t may reduce the ex ante incentives to create con-
tent, which also entails a social cost. In this remark, we are not taking this cost into
account.
Remark 4: [Ex post e±ciency, and the choice among protection systems]
(a) If pI > pJ and 2K(pI) < K(2pJ); the content providers prefer competition to
collusion, although collusion might be socially more e±cient.
(b) If pI > pJ and 2K(pI) > K(2pJ ); the content providers might prefer competition
to collusion, although collusion is socially more e±cient.
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(c) If pI < pJ and 2K(pI) > K(2pJ); the content providers prefer collusion to com-
petition, although competition might be socially more e±cient.
(d) If pI < pJ and 2K(pI) < K(2pJ); the content providers might prefer collusion to
competition, although competition is socially more e±cient.
5. Comparing Competitive and Collusive Prices
We have not made enough assumptions to know whether pJ is greater than pI or
pI^ . Because the products are substitutes, collusion has a tendency to raise price
relative to independent pricing with perfect legal enforcement, pI^ : But because joint
protection is more costly than separate protection, there is an o®setting e®ect. Perhaps
counterintuitively, it may occur that pJ < pIor pJ < pI^ . Therefore, consumers can
bene¯t from consolidation of pricing control in a single ¯rm that deploys a single
protection system.
For this discussion we examine a more fully speci¯ed model. Consider two ¯rms
1; 2, each facing a demand for its content that depends negatively on its own price
and positively on the competitor's price. Let ¯rm 1's demand be de¯ned as
D1(p1; p2) = maxf1¡ p1 + cp2; 0g (5.1)
where 0 · p1; p2 · 1, and 0 · c · 1. The parameter c determines the degree of
substitutability between the two products. Firm 2's demand is symmetrically de¯ned.
Let the costs of protection be de¯ned by
K(e) = k + ·e2
so that k is a ¯xed cost and 2·e is the marginal cost of increasing the cost of circum-
vention.
When the ¯rms compete using separate protection systems, ¯rm 1's best re-
sponse function is 1+cp2
2+2·
(symmetrically for ¯rm 2), and the symmetric Nash equilib-
rium prices and per-¯rm pro¯ts are given by:
pI =
1
2 + 2·¡ c (5.2)
¼I =
1 + ·
(2 + 2·¡ c)2 ¡ k (5.3)
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As noted previously, technical protection moderates the price of content (with
· > 0), compared to perfect legal protection. The equilibrium price with perfect legal
enforcement would be pI^ = 1=(2¡ c); which is higher than pI :
Suppose now that ¯rms own a technical protection system as a joint monopolist.
The level of protection must satisfy e ¸ p1+p2, and this inequality will be satis¯ed as
an equality. The ¯rms maximize joint pro¯t (4.1). The symmetric pro¯t-maximizing
prices, quantities, and total pro¯ts are:
pJ =
1
2 + 4·¡ 2c (5.4)
¼J =
2(1¡ c)
(2 + 4·¡ 2c)2 ¡ k (5.5)
Proposition 3: In the context of the above model with linear demand and
quadratic protection costs, the pro¯t-maximizing prices with a shared protection sys-
tem, (pJ ; pJ); are higher than the competitive prices with separate protection systems,
(pI ; pI); if 2· < c; and otherwise are lower.
The proof follows directly from comparing the expressions (5.2) and (5.4). The
price-moderating e®ect of the shared protection is increasing in ·, but the collusive
e®ect of joint pricing is increasing in c. The latter e®ect dominates if 2· < c:
Aside from any strategic bene¯t due to coordinating prices, vendors have an
incentive to share a technical protection system in order to save ¯xed costs. This
incentive is o®set by the higher marginal costs of protection in a shared system, which
will also cause the price to be lower. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these
e®ects, a shared protection system may be bene¯cial to both consumers and vendors.
Example 1: To illustrate, suppose ¯rst that the demands for the content are
independent (c = 0) and marginal costs for protection are positive, (· > 0.) As stated
in the proposition, the equilibrium prices (pI ; pI) given by (5.2) are higher than the
collusive prices (pJ ; pJ) given by (5.4). Now consider the ¯rm's pro¯ts given by (5.3)
and (5.5), noting that each ¯rm's share of joint pro¯ts is ¼
J
2
. Vendors prefer a joint
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system if
1
2(1 + ·)
¡ 1
2(1 + 2·)2
< k (5.6)
Total consumer surplus at a given symmetric price level p is s(p), de¯ned in
(2.1). Clearly, s(pJ ) > s(pI). Therefore, if (5.6) holds, vendors and consumers both
prefer shared protection. From an aggregated standpoint, shared protections are
better when 2s(pJ) + ¼J > 2s(pI) + 2¼I , which holds if
(1 + 2·)2
4(1 + ·)2
¡ (1 + 4·)
2
4(1 + 2·)2
+
1
2(1 + ·)
¡ 1
2(1 + 2·)2
< k (5.7)
Because the di®erence between the ¯rst two terms of (5.7) is negative, (5.7) holds if
(5.6) holds, but not necessarily vice versa. Thus, for a wide range of parameter values,
¯rms will be too reluctant to share a system, relative to what is e±cient.
Example 2: Suppose now that c > 0 and · = 0. Then consumers are unam-
biguously worse o® with collusion than competitive pricing and separate protections,
that is, pJ > pI : Comparing (5.3) and (5.5), for all k ¸ 0; c > 0, we ¯nd that ¼I < ¼J
2
.
Since the collusive prices are higher than the competitive prices, and the total costs are
smaller, pro¯ts are higher with joint protection. However vendors have more incentive
to create joint protections than is optimal from the consumers' point of view. Vendors
do not account for the reduction in consumers' surplus due to the higher prices.
Perhaps the most surprising conclusion is that, depending on the relative mag-
nitude of the collusive e®ects and cost advantages, collusive pricing with a shared
protection system may be socially and privately preferable to the competitive out-
come with separate protections.
6. Joint Ownership of a Protection Subsidiary: Is it Collusive?
So far we have assumed that when the content providers share a technical protection
system, they somehow manage to coordinate their prices and achieve what we have
called a collusive outcome (pJ ; pJ). However, such collusion might be avoidable with a
suitable antitrust policy. But which of the prices pI^ ; pI or pJ is a reasonable antitrust
objective? If pI or pJ is lower than pI^ , we cannot necessarily conclude that consumers
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are better o®, since the technically-facilitated price pI or pJ can continue inde¯nitely,
whereas the proprietary price pI^ will expire. As we showed for the monopoly case in
section 2 (and is also true more generally), both consumers and ¯rms can be better
o® with lower prices that last forever.
It can only happen that pI^ < pJ if the digital products are substitutes, and
close substitutes at that. But even if consumers would have lower prices with perfect
legal enforcement than with a shared protection system, this does not necessarily mean
that the collusive price lowers welfare. Given that the ¯rms must pay for technical
protections, they may earn less pro¯t with the collusive price pJ than with perfect
legal enforcement. Pro¯t may also be so low that it thwarts investment in content:
As noted above, we will not resolve the question of the right antitrust objec-
tive, since we are focusing on ex post e±ciency, and not on the incentives to create.
Instead, as a tool to understand how (or if) a particular policy objective could be
implemented, we address the more limited question of how prices depend on the own-
ership and governance of the shared technical protection system. The one case we
have already analyzed, complete merger leading to prices (pJ ; pJ ), might be challenged
on a ¯rst-principles theory that the owners of competing proprietary goods should not
be allowed to merge. We therefore consider weaker forms of cooperation among the
¯rms, where they share the costs of a technical protection system, but retain their
individual marketing identities. Even so, the ¯rms will often be able to support the
\collusive" price pJ :
The simplest pro¯t- and cost-sharing scheme is to delegate authority for pricing
and protection to a jointly owned subsidiary, which is owned in ¯xed shares ®1; ®2.
That organizational structure will clearly lead to collusion, since ¯rm 1's pro¯t is
®1¼
J(p1; p2)
and likewise for ¯rm 2. Both ¯rms favor the prices that maximize joint pro¯t, namely,
(pJ ; pJ): The content providers will have no incentive to undermine this outcome.
A natural conjecture is that the market will be more competitive if the ¯rms
can share costs but not revenues. We consider (i) independent pricing with ¯xed cost
shares, (ii) independent pricing with cost shares equal to revenue shares, and (iii) a
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wholly owned subsidiary that sets prices to maximize pro¯t and distributes the pro¯t
according to revenue shares. The third option will by de¯nition lead to collusive
prices, just as complete merger will. It is mainly a benchmark for a further inquiry
in the next section: What if the subsidiary sets prices, but the content providers can
charge supplemental prices (or give rebates) o® the subsidiary's books, thus a®ecting
the revenue shares?
We will see that among the three options, option (i) with ¯xed cost shares
is most likely to result in prices lower than the collusive price pJ : Option (ii), with
cost shares proportional to the revenue provided, may also lead to prices below the
collusive price, but not as reliably as ¯xed shares.
(i) Suppose the ¯xed cost shares are (®1; ®2): The only coordination of prices
that the protection system facilitates is that the sum of prices cannot exceed the level
of protection, p1 + p2 · e: With the level of protection e ¯xed by the subsidiary, ¯rm
1's pro¯t is the following if p1 + p2 · e; and otherwise is ¡®1K(e):
R1(p1; p2) ¡ ®1K(e) (6.1)
Suppose that the ¯rms try to support the price (pJ ; pJ) by choosing a protection
level e = 2pJ : Then provided pJ > pI^ and the assumptions R1, R2 hold, the unique
unconstrained equilibrium in prices is (pI^ ; pI^): The ¯rms will therefore achieve that
outcome for any protection level e larger than 2pI^ : Anticipating this, the ¯rms will
choose e = 2pI^ ; and achieve prices (pI^ ; pI^):
Thus, ¯xed cost shares will not support the collusive price pJ when the com-
petitive price pI^ is lower. This might look good to the antitrust authorities, but the
¯xed cost shares present two problems. First, in the case that the content providers
are not symmetric, low-volume content providers may pay so much relative to their
revenue that they drop out of the market. Fixed cost shares cannot guard against
this unless the relative popularity of the content is known in advance. Even then,
choosing the cost shares may constitute a disabling ex ante bargaining problem. The
second problem is that, wanting to avoid competition, the ¯rms may prefer another
form of governance. It is of interest to know whether competition is inevitable in the
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case pI^ < pJ ; or whether other \reasonable" forms of governance will avoid it. This
question goes to whether the antitrust authorities need to intervene. They may (or
may not) want to disallow a form of governance that supports the collusive outcome
pJ :
(ii) Suppose that the cost shares are equal to revenue shares instead of being
¯xed. De¯ne the revenue share provided by ¯rm 1 (symmetrically, ¯rm 2) as:
®1(p1; p2) =
R1(p1; p2)
R1(p1; p2) +R2(p1; p2)
(6.2)
Conditional on the level of protection e, ¯rm 1's pro¯t is the following, provided
p1 + p2 · e:
R1(p1; p2) ¡ ®1(p1; p2)K(e) (6.3)
The owners of the subsidiary must ¯rst agree on the level of protection e, knowing
that they will then compete on price subject to the constraint that p1+p2 · e: (When
the ¯rms are symmetric, as here, they will not disagree on e; although this will be an
issue more generally.)
To see whether the ¯rms can support the pro¯t-maximizing prices (pJ ; pJ ) with
revenue-based cost sharing, we ask whether p1 = p
J maximizes (6.3) when p2 = p
J :
The cost share ®1 increases in R1, and since R2(p
I^ ; pJ) < R2(p
J ; pJ ); it follows that
®1(p
J ; pJ ) < ®1(p
I^ ; pJ). Thus, the revenue consideration, that reducing price increases
¯rm 1's revenue, is o®set by the cost consideration, that the reduced price increases
¯rm 1's cost share. Sharing the cost proportionally to revenue will dampen any
incentive that the ¯rm has to reduce price from the collusive price pJ ; at least relative
to ¯xed cost shares. There will be circumstances in which the collusive outcome
(pJ ; pJ) can be sustained by merger, but not by revenue-based cost sharing, and there
will be circumstances in which revenue-based pro¯t sharing will not cause ¯rms to
compete to the competitive price (pI^ ; pI^) when pro¯t sharing with ¯xed shares would
have that e®ect.
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(iii) In the third form of governance, we assume that the subsidiary sets the
prices (p1; p2) = (p
J ; pJ ) that maximize joint pro¯t, ¼J . Firm 1 (symmetrically, ¯rm
2) has no direct control over its pro¯t, but its pro¯t is
®1(p
J ; pJ )¼J (pJ ; pJ)
In the next section we point out that, depending on the technology, the ¯rms
might be able to reclaim some control over price by making price rebates directly to
users. We consider the content providers' incentive to constrain their own behavior
in this regard through the technical aspects of the protection system they use. If
the technology preserves some mechanism by which content providers can provide
supplements or rebates to the royalties chosen by the subsidiary, they will ¯nd it very
hard to resist using those capabilities, and this has an impact on competition. The
connection between technology and competition is an important one, so we address it
further in a separate section.
7. Collusion through Technology
We said in the previous section that the pricing consequences of complete merger can
be achieved technologically by delegating all pricing authority to a subsidiary that sets
prices to maximize pro¯t. In fact, a user of content might pay prices to two parties:
the content provider and the subsidiary. Although the consumer cares only about the
sum of these two prices, and might be unaware that he or she is paying two prices for
each piece of content, control over the prices will determine whether the total price is
collusive. Our point in this section is that technology constrains who controls prices.
The protections may or may not allow content providers to supplement prices or make
rebates. Hence, neither the content providers nor the antitrust authorities will be
indi®erent as to the technology that is deployed.
Suppose that the subsidiary chooses prices (royalties) (pJ ; pJ ); and that ¯rm 1
¯nds some way to provide a supplement ² to its price. Since the subsidiary's optimal
policy will be to choose e = pJ + pJ ; the ¯rm's only option is to give a rebate, ² < 0:
A positive supplement would lead to circumvention.
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If ¯rm 1 makes no supplements or rebates to the price, its pro¯t can be written
as
®1(p
J ; pJ )¼J (pJ ; pJ) = R1(p
J ; pJ )¡ ®1(pJ ; pJ )K(pJ + pJ )
The supplement ² < 0 does not have the same e®ect on ¯rm 1's pro¯t as if the
subsidiary administered the price change. First, the rebate will not result in a cost
saving on the technical protections, since the level of protection e stays ¯xed: Second,
the rebate will change the ¯rm's revenue share, hence cost share, but not in the same
way as if the price reduction were administered and accounted by the subsidiary. We
assume that the rebates on price are not taken into account in calculating cost shares,
although the changes in usage are taken into account.
If ¯rm 1 adds a supplement ² to its price, ¯rm 1's revenue share, including only
the part accounted for by the subsidiary, becomes
~®1(p
J ; pJ ; ²) =
pJD1(pJ + ²; pJ )
pJD1(pJ + ²; pJ ) + pJD2(pJ + ²; pJ)
(7.1)
Comparing (7.1) with (6.2), which is the revenue share when all revenue passes
through the subsidiary, it holds that
~®1(p
J ; pJ ; ²) > ®1(p1; p
J )jp1=pJ+² for every ² < 0
That is, a rebate outside the subsidiary will increase ¯rm 1's revenue share,
hence cost share, more than a decrease in price paid through the subsidiary.
Assuming that the subsidiary administers the collusive prices (pJ ; pJ); and sets
the protection level at e = pJ +pJ , the pro¯t of ¯rm 1, as a function of its supplement
²; is
R1(p
J + ²; pJ )¡ ~®1
¡
pJ ; pJ ; ²
¢
K(e) (7.2)
and symmetrically for ¯rm 2.
The price reduction of size ² will be pro¯table under the cost-sharing schemes,
respectively, if
R1(p
J + ²; pJ )¡ ®1(pJ + ²; pJ )K(e) > R1(pJ ; pJ )¡ ®1(pJ ; pJ)K(e) (7.3)
R1(p
J + ²; pJ )¡ ~®1(pJ ; pJ ; ²)K(e) > R1(pJ ; pJ )¡ ®1(pJ ; pJ)K(e) (7.4)
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For any level of protection e, and for any ² < 0; the pro¯t (6.3) is larger than
the pro¯t (7.2) when ¯rm 1's price is equal to pJ + ² :
R1(p
J + ²; pJ )¡ ®1(pJ + ²; pJ )K(e) > R1(pJ + ²; pJ)¡ ~®1
¡
pJ ; pJ ; ²
¢
K(e)
Thus (7.4) implies (7.3), but not vice versa, implying that content providers pricing
within the subsidiary would want to drop their prices, but not content providers who
can only drop their prices by making rebates on the side. This observation, together
with the considerations in the previous section, leads to parts (c) and (d) of Remark 5.
(Parts (a) and (b) are trivial, as explained above, but are included for completeness.)
Remark 5: Suppose that pI^ < pJ . Then
(a) Suppose the content providers delegate pricing authority to a subsidiary that
maximizes joint pro¯t ¼J : Then regardless of how the pro¯ts are shared, the
subsidiary will implement the collusive prices (pJ ; pJ):
(b) If the content providers pay ¯xed shares of the cost and price independently, they
will price as they would with perfect legal enforcement, namely, (pI^ ; pI^):
(c) If the content providers price independently through a subsidiary with revenue-
based pro¯t sharing, the collusive prices (pJ ; pJ) may not be sustainable.
(d) If the subsidiary sets the prices and distributes pro¯ts based on revenue shares,
not accounting for unveri¯able rebates on the side, the collusive price may not
be sustainable, but will be sustainable in more circumstances than in (c).
We thus arrive at a result which is not very surprising. The best strategy for
supporting the collusive price pJ is for the ¯rms to relinquish all pricing authority to
the wholly owned subsidiary. If there is anything subtle about this result, it is that
¯rms must renounce their ability to make rebates on the side, and that this capability
might be implemented through technology.
Suppose, for example, that the following systems are observed in the market:
(1) Content is given away for free, but a protection system charges a royalty to use it.
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Content providers do not deal directly with users, but earn shares of the subsidiary's
pro¯t, possibly ¯xed, but possibly proportional to revenue. (2) Users pay content
providers, and do not pay the subsidiary that administers the technical protection
system. However, the revenues are veri¯able, and the cost shares are proportional to
revenue. (3) Users pay the subsidiary to use the content, but the subsidiary tracks
usage in order to facilitate a \frequent-user" program allowing rebates. The net pro¯t
is shared according to revenue earned through the subsidiary, which does not include
the rebates.
The market structure (1), where content is given away for free, is likely to sup-
port the collusive outcome. The market structures (2) and (3) preserve independent
pricing, so the collusive price might be undermined, but market structure (3) might
nevertheless keep collusion intact in circumstances where (2) would not.
Which of these market structures are feasible depends on the technology of the
protection system. The content providers and antitrust authorities may have di®erent
views as to what is appropriate. The content providers will clearly prefer the system
(1) that supports the collusive outcome. Conversely, the antitrust authorities might
want to undermine the collusive price pJ whenever pI^ < pJ : If so, they may favor a
governance structure in which the ¯rms price independently and the costs are shared
according to accurately accounted revenue shares { if the ¯rms choose lower prices,
that has to be done within the subsidiary's accounting system so that the cost shares
are accurate. However option (1) would not be their ¯rst choice, as option (1) does
not preserve any independence in pricing.
8. Conclusions and Open Questions
Our main message is that technical protections can reduce prices for digital content
whether the protections are separate or shared. Content providers will choose their
technology with this in mind { technology can be collusive.
We have explored the divergence between the private incentive to create a
shared system and the circumstances in which that would be e±cient. There are two
incentives for content providers to share a system. One is that it saves the ¯xed costs
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of implementing and administering the system. The other is that it may give them
an opportunity for coordinated or collusive pricing. One of these is in the public
interest, and the other may not be. But collusive pricing is less a threat than it
appears because a shared system is an attractive target for circumvention, and the
¯rms can reduce circumvention by lowering prices.
Of course, the welfare implications are ambiguous. Technical protections are
expensive. The expense is a social waste, as compared to perfect legal enforcement.
Content providers are burdened in two ways: by the cost of protection and by the
lower prices they receive for access to the content. In the end, smaller rewards for
content providers will mute the creative impulse. Nevertheless, we have found a silver
lining, namely, that users will pay lower prices.
The pricing options we have investigated do not exhaust the possibilities sug-
gested in the introduction. The systems we have considered govern the pricing of
content, rather than devices, and content itself can be priced in di®erent ways, de-
pending on how use can be metered. Content today can be purchased on physical
media, giving the right to unlimited or only a few viewings, or it can be purchased on a
per-viewing basis such as video-on-demand. Subscription services like cable television
bundle these services in yet another way, by giving unlimited viewings per unit time.
Basing royalties on usage has the virtue of taxing the more popular content and the
higher-demand users more highly. It may thus reduce distortions as compared, for
example, to putting the royalty on media players or charging a ¯xed royalty per unit
time. Taxing the media players will presumably create distortions at the \extensive
margin," that is, in the number of users in the market. The competitive e®ects of
what is priced have not yet been explored.
Although we have studied shared systems, competition among third-party in-
termediaries may be the better market structure. Bergemann, Feigenbaum, Shenker
and Smith (2004) have proposed to study \trusted systems" as intermediaries in two-
sided markets (Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2004), focusing on competition. In the
framework of this paper, perfect competition is hard to de¯ne, because the strategies
(prices) of the content providers using a common system are constrained by the strat-
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egy (level of protection) of the trusted system. For example, a content provider will
not necessarily sign up with the cheapest intermediary, because the prices that the
content provider can charge depend on the level of protection provided by the system,
but also, importantly, on the prices charged by the other content providers who are
using it. At the same time, the intermediary recognizes that the level of protection
it provides will determine the number of content providers it attracts. Both the level
of protection and the prices charged by the other vendors using the system determine
the attractiveness of the system to any given vendor.
9. Appendix: Prices with Dispersion in Circumvention Costs
Return to the content provider's pro¯t function with dispersion in circumvention costs,
given by (2.2).
Since ¦(p; e) < p(1 ¡ p) at every p; e; pro¯t is smaller with technical protec-
tion than with perfect legal enforcement. The optimal proprietary price, say p(e),
maximizes (2.2), conditional on the level of protection e; and satis¯es
@
@p
¦(p; e)jp=p(e) =
·
(1¡G(p; e)) @p(1¡ p)
@p
¡ p(1¡ p)g(p; e)
¸
jp=p(e) = 0 (9.1)
Since the derivative is negative whenever @p(1¡p)
@p
· 0; the optimal price p(e) is lower
than the monopoly price, p¤ = 1=2; regardless of e:
The proprietor also optimizes with respect to the level of protection e: The
derivative of ¦ with respect to e is
@
@e
¦(p; e)jp=p(e) = ¡p(1¡ p)@G(p; e)
@e
¡K 0(e) (9.2)
The ¯rst term, which is positive since @G(p;e)
@e
< 0; represents the saved revenue due
to a decrease in circumvention if e is increased, and the second term represents the
marginal cost. Combining with (9.1),
@
@e
¦(p; e)jp=p(e) = ¡(1¡G(p; e))
g(p; e)
@G(p; e)
@e
@p(1¡ p)
@p
jp=p(e) ¡K 0(e) = 0 (9.3)
It is easy to see in an example that dispersion in circumvention costs can cause
the proprietor to charge a lower price than without dispersion. Suppose that K 0 is
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increasing and that the distribution of circumvention costs is uniform on an interval
around the strength of protection e :
G(p; e) =
0 if p < e¡ 1=2
p¡ e+ 1=2 if e¡ 1=2 < p < e+ 1=2
1 if p > e+ 1=2
g (p; e) = 1 for e¡ 1=2 < p < e+ 1=2
It follows from (9.2) that the optimal (p; e) entails both circumvention and
purchases, so that 0 < 1 ¡ G(p; e) < 1. It follows from (9.1) that p(e) is increasing
with e: In (9.3), (1¡G(p;e))
g(p;e)
@G(p;e)
@e
is less than one. It then follows from (9.3) that the
optimal strength of protection is smaller when circumvention costs are dispersed than
when not, as follows.
Let ~e be the optimal protection when circumvention costs are dispersed, and e^
when not. Then @p(1¡p)
@p
jp=e^ = K 0 (e^) : It follows from (9.3) that p(e^) < e^. (In fact,
at any given protection level e, not only e^; the optimal price is lower with dispersed
circumvention costs than with no dispersion.) Then if ~e < e^; it follows that p(~e) <
p(e^) < e^; the optimal price is lower with dispersed circumvention costs than not.
Suppose instead that e^ · ~e; which implies that K 0(e^) · K 0(~e) and p(e^) · p(~e):
Then using (9.3), it follows that @p(1¡p)
@p
jp=p(~e) > @p(1¡p)@p jp=e^ which again implies that
p(~e) < e^:
Thus, in a plausible example, dispersion in the costs of circumvention decreases
the price of content, but also decreases the proprietor's pro¯t. In addition, there will
be consumers who circumvent the protection in equilibrium, adding to social costs.
Consumers' surplus plus pro¯t in each period, designated W (p; e) ; is
W (p; e) = s(p) + p(1¡ p) +
Z p
0
µ G(µ; e) dµ ¡ C(p; e)
=
Z 1
p
µdµ +
Z p
0
µ G(µ; e) dµ ¡ C(p; e)
where C(e; p) is the total cost of circumventions that occur in equilibrium:
C(p; e) =
Z 1
0
ÃZ minfp;µg
0
c dG(c; e)
!
dµ
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